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Legal Policy, Technique and Research in Family 
Law-Some Comparative Aspects 
Anders Agell* 
The title of this presentation refers to legal policy. I 
believe, however, that there is one consideration that could be 
seen as the leading objective in family law. That objective is to 
create good living conditions for children, in an attempt to 
ensure that the next generation is both clever and wise. This 
goal is indirectly the most important reason for the existence of 
the institution of marriage. Of course, the marriage institution 
is also independently important for the relationship between 
husband and wife. All other specific objectives in family law are 
of a more variable character and do not have, in my opinion, 
the same paramount importance. 
Questions of legal technique are almost as important as 
matters of legal policy. We may be better able to deal with 
social issues if we assess the whole legal machinery of family 
law with respect to its capacity to: (1) solve problems without 
destroying human relations, and (2) do so in a way that 
facilitates fairness, foreseeability, and cost-efficiency. 
In many countries, modern family law develops in one and 
the same direction. Two examples demonstrating this are: (1) 
grounds for divorce have become more and more liberal; and (2) 
partly as the result of changed sex-roles, joint custody has been 
promoted more and more. The technical method for introducing 
a change can differ, however. With regard to joint custody, the 
substance of the concept "custody" can vary considerably. For 
example, in the new English Children's Act the concept of 
custody in the traditional sense has been abolished in favor of 
the concept of parental responsibility. That change has been 
combined with an introduction of some subconcepts which give 
the courts competence to specify, if necessary, what each parent 
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(or other caretaker) of the child is permitted to do or not to 
do. 1 
On a more general basis, I would like to emphasize the 
technical differences in legal reasoning between common law 
countries and civil law countries.2 Today, legislation has 
increased importance for legal development in common law 
countries. My impression concerning family law is that in the 
common law countries legislation provides more open solutions 
than does equivalent legislation in civil law countries. The 
common law courts thereby continue to play a more profound 
role in legal development than their counterparts in civil law 
countries. 
Against this background, consider a hypothesis on 
differences in legal thinking. In the law-making process, one 
has to find the best considerations of legal policy for solving an 
individual case. The outcome normally depends on application 
of a legal rule that contains the special conditions, which I for 
present purposes call concepts, applicable to the specific case. 
One might say that the legal concepts are inserted as formally 
decisive elements between the legal policy underlying the rule, 
on the one hand, and the solution of the individual case on the 
other hand. 
My hypothesis is that legal concepts are sometimes given 
less importance in the law-making process in common law 
countries than in civil law countries. Fair solutions are 
emphasized in common law countries, while foreseeability is 
emphasized in civil law countries. Yet another way of 
expressing this distinction is to say that in civil law systems 
the final solutions to family law problems are created at an 
earlier stage in the law-making process. The law, as enacted by 
a legislature, emphasizes a specific set of conditions and by so 
doing intentionally cuts off a number of possible arguments 
that fall outside the chosen conditions or concepts. 
Final solutions to family law problems in common law 
systems, on the other hand, are crafted more individually as 
the matter is heard in court. The final solution comes later in 
the law-making process. 
I now raise the question of what legal scholars do, and 
what legal scholarship should imply. A simple answer is 
1 Children's Act, 1989, ch. 41 (Eng.) 
2 In this paper I do not propose that either common law or civil law 
represent homogenous alternatives. 
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impossible, since legal scholarship can use many different 
methods. In my opinion, however, a legal scholar should choose 
methods that differ from those used by a judge or a practicing 
lawyer. Of course, there are similarities, but the differences are 
more important. Both a judge and a practicing lawyer work 
primarily on individual cases, the former to solve the case in a 
suitable way, the latter to protect the interest of his client. The 
legal scholar, however, should have as the main objective of his 
or her study the system of rules within a special area. A core 
part of a scholar's traditional legal study should be the 
coherence of different rules, both formally and with respect to 
the relationship between concepts and legal policy. In such an 
undertaking the study of individual cases is only a tool for a 
more far-reaching purpose. Such an approach offers the best 
potential for interesting conclusions and gives a greater 
possibility of influencing legal development. This approach 
should also be of general societal value to a country, since its 
legal system is scrutinized by scholars who have a systematic 
and unbiased attitude. No other category of lawyers, not even 
members of a supreme court or legislature, can claim this same 
attitude. 
The situation in the United States is a special one. 
President Charles de Gaulle is reported as having once said 
that it is impossible to govern a country that produces 189 
different cheeses. Applying President de Gaulle's comment to 
the United States, how does a legal scholar analyze legal 
concepts that are sometimes alternative or compelling and 
underlie the development of the law in over fifty different 
jurisdictions? American legal scholars nonetheless must do this 
and are doing it in a very interesting way, as this conference 
has shown. 
Certainly, the interaction between legislation and case law, 
on the one hand, and legal scholarship on the other would be 
worthy of a comparative study of its own. I believe that legal 
scholars in the United States, who work with many 
jurisdictions where case law is a leading source of legal 
development, work and think in a manner that differs 
considerably from the way of thinking of legal scholars in civil 
law countries. My impression is that scholars in the common 
law tradition concentrate on finding good solutions, as far as 
legal policy is concerned, to social problems. Civil law scholars 
have a greater interest in how the rules of legal solutions 
should be conceptually construed or applied. The problems 
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facing each legal system are the same, but the chosen starting 
points, and manner of analysis, differ considerably. 
Legal scholarship can imply the use of varying methods, 
including legal-sociological, legal-economic, legal-psychological, 
and other special perspectives. As already mentioned above, I 
am personally inclined to emphasize the value of analyzing the 
coherence of different legal policies, and above all, the 
coherence of different legal concepts. A set of rules can be seen 
as a building in which the foundation consists of the basic legal 
rules and concepts construed with respect to the chosen 
considerations of legal policy. In the upper floors we find more 
specialized rules for more specific problems. However, if one 
meets a problem on the second floor, one may well be required 
to go down and study the foundation in order to find a coherent 
solution. 
One illustration of this analogy of legal rules as a building 
may be the problem of contracts. Contracts present many 
different problems in family law. Family law should not 
abstain from using agreements to achieve peaceful solutions to 
conflicts. Agreements cannot solve all problems, however, and 
some legal rules (e.g., on responsibility for children or on the 
basic duty to offer support during an existing marriage) should 
be given a compulsory character that leaves little room to 
negotiate a binding contract. The objective must be to find the 
right balance between different policy considerations and to 
transform the outcome into a coherent, comprehensive set of 
rules for a great number of questions (such as children, 
property, support, etc.) and different contractual problems, such 
as the conditions for validity of a contract and the effect of 
changed conditions. The analogy of a building, containing 
different floors and apartments, might be rather useful for 
describing how the role of contracts in family law should be 
built up and applied. In addition to the role of contracts in 
family law, many more areas lend themselves to studies of a 
systematic and conceptual character. 
A second example is whether the acquisition of a 
professional degree by one spouse should entitle the other, on 
the occasion of divorce, to compensation. Three different 
solutions have been used in American jurisdictions to award 
compensation. American courts have applied rules on division 
of property, on alimony, and on unjust enrichment to address 
this question. As a legal scholar, I would find it natural to 
study these alternatives by analyzing to what degree it is 
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possible to construe the rules on property division, alimony, 
and unjust enrichment in a systematically coherent way with 
respect to the value of a professional degree. 
A third problem suitable for conceptual analysis is the 
relationship at divorce between the economic issues relating to 
division of property, alimony, and maintenance. Obviously, the 
division of property issue can influence the need for alimony, 
and the topics of alimony and maintenance are linked to one 
another. I believe, however, that for analytic purposes it is best 
to treat the three issues as independently as possible. Such an 
approach promotes foreseeability and counteracts 
overbargaining and divorce conflicts. In common law there is 
the well known objection to this approach that it does not 
achieve the fairest result in individual cases. Nonetheless, 
within reasonable limits it is precisely the advantage of the 
legal method of conflict resolution that all possible arguments 
are not put in one melting pot but structured in advance when 
the rules are constructed. This is one expression of the peace-
making function of the whole legal system. I believe that a 
marital property system which contains clear rules for division 
of property is superior to a conceptually looser system for 
division of separate property of spouses. Unfair result of a 
marital property system can also be counteracted by special 
rules for exceptional cases. There should be no basic 
contradiction between fairness and foreseeability. Both 
objectives should be combined. 
A fourth example of a topic worthy of conceptual and 
systematical analysis is the treatment in American law of 
common law marriage and cohabitation outside marriage, in 
comparison with formal marriage. With a growing number of 
couples living together without formal marriage, there is a 
need for an in-depth analysis of the relationship between these 
three legal concepts, and their legal effect not only in family 
and property law but also in tax law, social welfare law and 
other legal areas. Courts will never perform the broad study 
that is required by this topic. 
In conclusion, I realize that my attitudes have been a bit 
pretentious. I certainly cannot compete with my extremely 
qualified audience when I comment upon American family law. 
However, as the saying goes, in order to understand national 
law one should study foreign law. I believe that, coming from 
different legal traditions, we can learn much from one another. 
